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In this paper, we maintain that despite so many “turns” affecting social 
history since the beginning of the XXth century, social history is now following 
various paths and this fact is one of its assets. 
It is also clear for us that the influence of cultural anthropology is the most 
original and persistent line affecting the evolution of social history in the last 
few decades. The current debate is now centred on the following questions: 
How can social history maintain the leadership that together with economic 
history it brought to bear during the last century? Can social history adapt itself 
to the new directions brought about by the “linguistic turn”? And what are the 
possibilities of a partnership with its neighbouring discipline, anthropological 
history? 
History and Philosophy 
If we were to state it, we would not be the first to say that social history is 
currently undergoing a crisis.1 And if people asked us why, we would have to 
reply by saying that it involves a crisis in social theory and in the philosophical 
anthropology that lies beneath all research and is related to the connections 
between social history and anthropological history, amongst other aspects: 
between social history and cultural anthropology and between pure history and 
philosophical anthropology, a matter that we will explain briefly. 
Some people believe  (and not without reason) that the practice of history – 
that is, research, the drawing up of conclusions and the pleasure of reading 
                                                 
1 Cf. Keith Windschuttle: The Killing of History: How a Discipline Is Being Murdered by Literary Critics 
and Social Theorists (Paddington: Macleay, 1996). 
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them, if there indeed is any – is more independent in respect to epistemology 
that what was thought to be the case or, if you prefer, it has less to do with 
philosophical anthropology than what was previously supposed. But this is 
only half true. Most historians work without ever considering philosophical 
problems, that is true, but it is because they have already resolved them, 
although they are de facto or at times badly resolved. The truth of the matter is 
that any elaboration of knowledge presupposes a concept of reality and 
therefore of people. 
What we have just stated is knowledge proper, even the inevitable. But 
knowledge proper or the inevitable is not the same as the learned. What we 
mean to say is, it is one thing that all historians – like all men and women – 
reason from a basis of the concept of what makes up a human being, even if this 
is unconsciously done, and it is another thing entirely to say they understand 
the philosophy of history and philosophical anthropology, opt for a specific line 
of thought and adapt themselves to that in their work as historians. This does 
not always happen. 
That is why it seems to us that – at times and without being obsessive about 
it – it is good that all historians identify how they conceive human beings and 
also the social group, and not just for the sake of curiosity but to assure 
themselves that they are correct and coherent in their work as historians: in the 
case that, without warning, they are elaborating a history in which human 
beings are conceived in a different manner than historians themselves conceive 
their own existence.   
The Origins of Social History: Economicism 
In the case of social history, it can in fact be said that a major part of its 
research has been undertaken in the West without “aiming” for a historical-
philosophical construction, while on the other hand, another major part has 
slipped away on paths that are close to very specific philosophical approaches. 
In fact, social history as knowledge only exists as a result of Hegelian 
philosophy: Marx on the one hand and the Dane Lorenz von Stein on the other, 
especially his History of the Social Movements in France from 1789 to the Present 
(1850-1855).2 These two heirs of Hegel – the former on the Left and the latter on 
the Hegelian Right – were the fathers of this discipline. 
We do not mean to say that it had to be that way (that goes without saying) 
nor that since it was that way, social history has to be either idealistic or 
economic. The only thing we are saying is that it was de facto born that way. 
And this was not inimportant, because with it social history emerged filtered 
through an idea that understood society as a group defined by “classes”, which 
were therefore the protagonists of social history and were defined by their 
economic profiles, their place in the processes of production of material goods. 
                                                 
2 Lorenz von Stein, Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage 
(Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1850-1855, 3 volumes). 
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This means that economicism has been present in the interpretation of social 
history for a long time and not only because of the presence of Marx during the 
origins of this discipline but also – and perhaps more so – because of the 
presence of von Stein. And it therefore filtered not only Marxist historiography 
but also to a large extent liberal historiography. 
Social History from the XIXth to the XXth Century 
But it undoubtedly must be admitted that not everything came from these 
two sources. Marx and von Stein were pioneers but the development of the 
study of social history was not established until the 1930s. In the time between – 
eighty years – there were many more, very different people who spoke of the 
nature of society and the way it should therefore be studied.   
If we were to specify a little more and tried to detail which were the systems 
of thought that were most influential in those eighty years, we would not 
hesitate in beginning with Max Weber and Émile Durkheim.3 Strictly speaking, 
they were sociologists – philosophers of the social – and not historians. But they 
made more than enough contributions to the field of history, some of which 
were as important as Max Weber’s theory on Die protestantische Ethik und der 
Geist des Kapitalismus (1904-1905). 
In another order of ideas, during the 1920s, the concept of “total history” 
gained ground in French historiography (and with it, in almost all the Latin 
world), led by the Annales School (AESC). A concept, and more generally a 
project, that owed much to the three lines of historiography developed during 
the XIXth century and studied in these very pages by Professor Iggers.  
It was the age of social and economic history. All “New Histories” (with 
Annales as their leader) were dedicated to the history of prices and salaries, of 
production and distribution, to demographic studies, to géohistoire, which was 
grounded in the geography of Paul Vidal de la Blache and his students and 
which without delay encountered new disciples in European and especially 
Mediterranean countries.4
                                                 
3 The main references for Durkheim and his school are in Professor Revel’s paper. See also: Steven 
Lukes, Émile Durkheim: His Work and Life. A Historical and Critical Study (revised edition, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1985); William Watts-Miller, Durkheim, Morals and Modernity (London: 
UCL Press, 1996); Mohamed Cherkaoui, Naissance d’une science sociale: la sociologie selon 
Durkheim (Genève: Droz, 1998). The bibliography on Max Weber and other German sociologists of his 
age, such as Georg Simmel and Otto Hintze, is also large. Some classic and recent studies on Weber, 
probably the most important sociologist of the last century: Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An 
Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1962); Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western 
Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); 
Rafael Llano, Max Weber Kulturphilosophie der Moderne: eine Untersuchung des Berufsmenschentums 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997); Siegfried Hermes, Soziales Handeln und Struktur der Herrschaft: 
Max Webers verstehende historische Soziologie am Beispiel des Patrimonialismus (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2003). 
4 See the book by Berdoulay cited by Jacques Revel: Vincent Berdoulay, La Formation de l’École 
française de géographie (Paris: Bibliothéque Nationale, 1981); David N. Livingstone, The 
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Nor can it be said that what follows would because of this succeed and 
inform all practitioners of social history from the 1920s onwards and after the 
Second World War. But it must be said that, if the discipline took hold then – 
since the 1930s – the anti-Fascism of those days was not far removed from it, 
especially in its Socialist and Communist variants, something that would end 
up converting social history into a combative history – in those days it was 
called “engagée”. In the back rooms of the history of society elaborated during 
those years, the idea beat strongly that the material basis of historic reality 
meant that human beings grouped themselves into “classes” and these moved 
history through the dialectic of conflicts – class conflicts – in such a way that the 
thought systems they allowed to shine through were epiphenomenal or, in the 
words of Hegel, “ideologies”. Individuals, or human beings, were protagonists 
of social progress – or simply “progress” – only if they had a “class 
consciousness” and acted accordingly to that consciousness, which was the 
same as accepting Karl Marx’s political project in practice in some of its 
interpretations. 
In terms of epistemological effects, the unity of these three lines of thought – 
those of idealistic, historicist and economicist tradition – implied various 
dichotomies that began emerging during those years and would later become 
the focus of methodological debates by those who studied the social sciences. 
Of course, as its protagonist was specifically the social, history was now 
undoubtedly understood to be not only personal and much less so individual: 
the dichotomy between structure and action, between object and subject (and 
objectivity and subjectivity), between macro- and microanalysis, between 
economy and culture. During the time we are discussing, it was understood 
that the origins of history, and therefore what was worth discovering, were 
structure, the object (using objectivist criteria; there was even talk of the 
“objective conditions of reality”), and macroanalysis; in short, the economy and 
its effects on the remaining social life order. All else – action, the subject, 
subjectivity, microanalysis, culture – was presented to us as something extra, 
secondary matters, when they were not being expressly rejected. 
All this also explains that, because it had to do with the history of the last 
two centuries, special importance was given to the history of the “workers’ 
movement”, until it reached the point that many identified social history with 
the history of the union movement and workers’ conflicts. It was without doubt 
a reduction of the initial objective of this field of history. But it was implicitly 
understood that the “social” fighters of the last two centuries had been defined 
by their proximity and, where possible, their inclusion in this movement. 
If all these results did not fit the mould despite all this, it was enough to 
point to the example of Spain. That is, if the origins of the social history of the 
modern world of those first people who showed interest in this field can be 
                                                                                                                                               
Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); 
Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997) and, more specifically, Susan W. Friedman, Marc Bloch, Sociology and Geography. 
Encountering Changing Disciplines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 5
located – as we believe it can – in the Historia de las agitaciones andaluzas by the 
notary Juan Díaz del Moral, first published in 1929, when this new discipline 
was in full bloom and in relation to, if not the anti-Fascist battles, then one of its 
courageous sequels, which was the agrarian reform begun in all of Europe in 
the 1920s and 30s concerning the large estate owner structure of property, a 
reform about which del Moral himself wrote another pioneering monograph.5
The historiographical work of a basically Christian educated man like 
Antonio Domínguez Ortiz separates itself practically alone from this approach 
until the 1970s, beginning from his Orto y ocaso de Sevilla: Estudio sobre la 
prosperidad y decadencia de la ciudad durante los siglos XVI y XVII.6
But this dominated neither in Latin countries nor those with a Germanic or 
English tradition. In the latter, one of the first lines of social history renewal was 
the magazine Past & Present, begun in 1952 and one of the main organs of those 
times7. It is true, however, that this tendency was most intensely felt in the area 
of French influence. Here, the predominant historicism in the men from the 
Annales School went hand in hand with Labroussian inspired economicism8. 
Ernest Labrousse, who was only remembered some years ago, was responsible 
for a great number of the “théses d’État” that were written and later published 
by students of Braudel. 
But one should not think that the historicist inspiration of one, Braudel, was 
completely removed from the economicist tendency of the other, Labrousse, but 
instead believe that it also produced a syncretism that was quite fruitful. 
Without having to look any further, in Spain this was proven in a faultless way 
by the first “modern” work about the history of the Spanish workers’ 
movement: the book by Antonio María Calero specifically titled Historia del 
movimiento obrero en Granada, 1909-1923 (1973). By undertaking his research 
work, Calero realised that the majority of workers in Granada had been far 
removed from this movement throughout the XIXth century and the first few 
years of the XXth century, times in which – he wrote – they had retained 
“conservative” ideological viewpoints. Faced with this proven fact – which 
could have been extremely fruitful, as it had been in England for over a decade 
– the case was made of the notion of class-consciousness. If the workers in 
Granada were conservative, it was because they did not have a class-
                                                 
5 Cf. Juan Díaz del Moral, Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas-Córdoba: Antecedentes 
para una reforma agraria (Madrid: Revista de Derecho Privado, 1929); Juan Díaz del Moral, Las 
reformas agrarias de la posguerra 1918-1929 (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1967). 
The first edition was entitled, La reforma agraria y El estatuto catalán: Discursos pronunciados en las 
Cortes constituyentes por D. Juan Díaz del Moral y D. José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid: Revista de 
Occidente, 1932). 
6 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Orto y ocaso de Sevilla: Estudio sobre la prosperidad y decadencia de la 
ciudad durante los siglos XVI y XVII (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial, 1946). 
7 A series of significant articles on Past and Present can be found in the journal’s no. 100. 
8 Bernard Lepetit and Jean-Yves Grenier, “L’expérience historique. À propos de Camille Ernest 
Labrousse”, Annales. AESC. 6 (1989): 1337-1360. 
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consciousness. Therefore what proceeded was the delay of the study of its 
history until 1909, when this consciousness manifested itself. Of course, the 
First International had taken place – in the fields of Granada as well – and 
Calero dedicated some pages of his work to it, but the workers’ movement had 
begun at the beginning of the XXth century and it was then therefore that the 
social history of Granada also strictly began. 
 So how should it be understood? This is where Braudel and the 
epistemological pyramid of La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de 
Philippe II9 came to his aid. Calero organised his study starting with an analysis 
of “structure” (that is, the economy and expression of society in social classes), 
then continued with the “situation” (which explained economic and social 
movements before and after the crisis of 1917), and finished with the “events” 
(which involved, in short, traditional political history, but only of the “social” 
not the “bourgeois” kind; it was the history of workers’ parties and unions, of 
strikes and workers’ congresses). 
 In the Hispanic world at that time, the social history of the XXth century 
had been reduced to this: the workers’ movement. Everything else – all that was 
social that had not been proletariat – continued to live off the gains of Historia 
social y económica de España y América by Jaime Vicens Vives (1959) and was also 
influenced, especially from 1950 onwards, by the Annales School10. In the case 
of Spain, the weight of the political situation – the Franco regime – was 
certainly present, and from the point of view of all left-wing groups on the 
political horizon, this maintained the anti-Fascist situation in which social 
history had, let’s say, found itself. It therefore enriched a history that at heart 
demanded rights and an efficient tool to oppose the regime – although in some 
cases it was created from Franco’s own academic structures. 
The “Mentalities” Phase 
The work of Calero was not a late work. It appeared when the culmination of 
the French effort for “total history” was published: the four volumes of the 
Histoire économique et sociale de la France (1970-1979) by Fernand Braudel and 
Ernest Labrousse.11
But ten years earlier work had been undertaken in a different way. In effect, 
the “New History” assaulted “mentalities” in the late 1960s and 1970s. Its 
origins lay in the followers of Émile Durkheim, particularly Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, 
the author of La mentalité primitive (1931), which was so influential on Lucien 
                                                 
9 Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philipe II (Paris: Librairie 
Armand Colin, 1949). 
10 Victoria L. Enders, Jaime Vicens Vives, the Annales and Catalonia (Ann Arbor:University Microfilms 
International, 1984) and Josep M. Muñoz i Lloret, Jaume Vicens i Vives (1910-1960): una biografia 
intel.lectual (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1997). 
11 Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, dirs., Histoire économique et sociale de la France (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1970-1979). 
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Febvre.12 It was “l’histoire quantitative au troisième niveau”, as it was called by the 
prolific French historian Pierre Chaunu, who was at the same time a follower 
and rival of Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse.13
So this “mental phase” was the new stage registered in the history of the 
serial and the anthropological. The “history of mentalities” began its career 
with the work of modernists like Febvre and his follower Robert Mandrou 
(Mandrou maintained very bad relations with Fernand Braudel, to the point 
that he was expelled from the Executive Committee of AESC in the 1960s). There 
were medievalists like Jacques Le Goff, who continued this tradition and made 
of it one of the most characteristic features of the French school of history.14
In France itself, especially from 196915 onwards, Roland Mousnier defended 
the need for the qualitative evaluation of historical documents before 
attempting to explore the quantitative field. He also spoke of three, and not 
only one, different types of social expressions between the 15th and XXth 
centuries: there have been and always will be societies of caste, order and 
classes, and not everything was explained by economy. 
At the same time in Britain, The Making of the English Working Class by E. P. 
Thompson (1963) had already appeared, in which mentality had taken centre 
                                                 
12 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Paris: Alcan, 1910); L'Âme 
primitive (Paris: Alcan, 1927); La mentalité primitive (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1931); Le 
surnaturel et la nature dans la mentalité primitive (Paris: Alcan, 1931); La mythologie primitive: le 
monde mythique des Australiens et des Papous (Paris: Alcan, 1935). 
13 Pierre Chaunu, “Un nouveau champ pour l’histoire sérielle. Le quantitatif au troisième niveau”, 
Mélanges Fernand Braudel (Toulouse: Privat, 1972), II, pp. 105-125. 
14 The literature on the history of mentalities is so large that we have chosen to cite only some works: 
Ulrich Raulff, ed., Mentalitäten-Geschichte. Zur historischen Rekonstrution geistiger Prozesse (Berlin: 
Wagenbach-Gmbh, 1987); G.E.R. Lloyd, Desmystifyng Mentalities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) (one of the most satisfying books on the subject we know); Norman Simms, The Humming 
Tree: A Study in the History of Mentalities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992) (a monograph 
about Yaqui Indians but containing worthwhile generalisations). In regard to Mandrou, we have his 
Introduction à la France moderne. Essai de psychologie historique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1961) and the 
collective work devoted to him, Histoire sociale, sensibilités collectives et mentalités (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1985). John P. Cooper is correct when he writes: “[t]he whole conception of 
mentalités as inherited from Febvre (…) tends to create a uniformity which hides or denies the capacity 
of individuals and society to hold contradictory and incompatibles ideas and ideals simultaneously”, 
quoted from his “In Search of Agrarian Capitalism”, Past and Present, 80 (1978): 20-65, quotation on 
p. 22. On the influence of Durkheim on Febvre: Colbert Rhodes, “Émile Durkheim and the Socio-
Historical Thought of Lucien Febvre”, International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, 25 (1988): 
65-82. See also the article by Alain Boureau, “Propositions pour une histoire restreinte des mentalités”, 
Annales E.S.C., 44 (1989): 1481-1504. Microhistory and “histoire des mentalités” are combined in the 
work of Italian scholars like Ginzburg, Camporesi and Levi, etc. 
15 See Roland Mousnier, Les hiérarchies sociales de 1450 à nos jours (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1969). Sticking to the strictly sociological, he had already published until then, Problèmes de 
stratification sociale: Deux cahiers de la noblesse pour les États géneraux de 1649-1651, in 
collaboration with J.-P. Labatut and Y. Durand (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965); État et 
société sous François 1er et pendant le gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV (Paris: Centre de 
documentation universitaire, 1966); État et société en France  au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Centre 
de documentation universitaire, 1968); Problèmes de stratification sociale: Actes du colloque 
international, 1966, publiées par Roland Mousnier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). 
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stage in what was the most liberal interpretation of Marxism that could be 
made.16
Although one could not say that Thompson was a Gramscian, he did 
contribute to the imposition of a unique economicist culturalism to the turn 
made by the Italian Communist Party – and after that, its Latin brothers – 
favouring a cultural revolution as was conceived by Gramsci in his posthumous 
Prison Notebooks (1948-1951), written in the years 1928-1937 and resuscitated in 
the 1970s. 
At the same time, social philosophy during those years was highlighted by 
various approaches by Habermas concerning the sociology of discourse and the 
thoughts of Foucault on subjectivism (in those works referring to the 
interpretation of history)17, which were at heart Nietzsche’s philosophies 
historiographically applied and his manner of understanding history as an 
expression of “itself” (selbst) that is projected from or constructs reality, 
inevitably so because it constructs it for itself as a means for domination.18
In this way, many different people – all those mentioned since Thompson – 
guided one of the greatest lines of social history on the track of the history of 
suspicion, because of this discovery concerning the key of domination lying 
beneath all historic processes, whether this domination is a result of productive 
forces, a consequence of the Nietzschean construction of the self or the strength 
of Foucault’s discourse. 
But it was not a peaceful victory, simply recall the debate surrounding the 
Alltagsgeschichte – the history of daily life in Germany19 – and be warned that 
once the flag was raised by Thompson in 1963, we can see how “total history” 
held its own even though it was also hoisted in France in 197920. But the dice 
had been rolled; something had changed in the minds of Westerners. More 
                                                 
16 As Gertrude Himmelfarb put it, “the most influential of this group is E.P. Thompson”, and The Making 
“is still the most influential book produced by any member of the Group”: “The ‘Group’: British 
Marxist Historians”, in her The New History and the Old (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987), pp. 70-93 and 192-5, quotations, pp. 82 and 84. A perceptive analysis of E.P. Thompson’s 
"culturalist Marxism”, on Trygve R. Tholfsen, Ideology and Revolution in Modern Europe. An Essay on 
the Role of Ideas in History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 204-240. 
17 Michel Foucault, Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, Paris, Plon, 1961; Surveiller 
et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). Also by Foucault, Naissance de la clinique: 
Une archéologie du regard médical (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963). 
18 Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985). 
19 Vid. the critical writings of Geoff Eley, “Labor History, Social History, Alltagsgeschichte: Experience, 
Culture and the Politics of the Everyday: A New Direction for German Social History?": The Journal of 
Modern History, 41 (1989): 297-343, and Carola Lipp, “Writing History as Political Culture: Social 
History Versus Alltagsgeschichte: A German debate”: Storia della storiografia, 17 (1990): 68-100. 
20 On resistance to changing methods (understood as a return to politics – i.e. political mentality), Geoff 
Eley and Keith Nield, "Why does social history ignore politics?": Social history, 5 (1980): 249-271, and 
Shariff Gemie: "French social history and The return to politics", European history quarterly, 27 
(1997): 411-415. 
 9
specifically, “mentality” had been discovered as a first-class interpretative 
element, if not a cause of social change. Without reducing the historiographical 
to the political but taking both as an example of the presence and victory of a 
new “paradigm”, despite which these were the causes of change, it was an era 
of euphoria that would culminate with the “revolutionary” conservative 
reformism of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. 
Of course, certain agents of this change – in this case, Thompson – were still 
convinced that at the heart of it all lay material matters. In Italy, the heirs of 
Gramsci in the 1980s continued referring to a social history that encompassed 
the complete historic process, expressly in the manner of “total history” and 
understood as an opening to the “essential multiplicity of temporary structures 
and the complexity of social change”.21
But in the worst of cases, the material remained obscured, hidden, lost in the 
abyss because of mental attitudes. In such a way that the order was reversed in 
that series of dichotomies: action, or free human action, began to impose itself 
on structure; the subject on the object (and attention was paid exceedingly to 
subjectivism); Italy’s microhistory was born22, the supreme form of micro- over 
macroanalysis; the quantitative was no longer essential; culture defeated 
economy; some began to poke fun at class consciousness and started valuing 
the fact that many workers had retained conservative stances when leaders had 
for many years preached socialism or anarchism as something historically 
significant and consistent. 
In some countries, political conditions and the capacity to receive innovative 
information – and at times both factors – influenced the fact that this happened 
in another way and at a different pace. It goes without saying that this was the 
case of Soviet countries and the dictatorships in southern Europe. In Spain, the 
change from an economicist to a mentality point of view was delayed because 
of various factors. One was France’s own historiographical dependence and 
another was the main role represented by Socialists and Communists opposing 
Franco’s regime until at least 1975-77, which was when people first started 
abandoning Marxism as a defining ideology. On the other hand, the decreased 
importance of the Spanish Communist party was made apparent in the 1977 
elections – the first free elections after 40 years. It was only then that Spanish 
Communists saw themselves heading towards a change in their ideological 
basis, which led them to connect to the resurrection of Gramsci and assume 
Eurocommunism with Italian origins. 
                                                 
21 Giuseppe Cacciatore, “Neue Sozialgeschichte e teoria della storia”, Studi storici, 25 (1984): 119-137, 
quotation on p. 125. 
22 See Giovanni Levi: “On Microhistory”, in New perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. by Peter Burke 
(London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 93-113; although in the English-speaking 
world Clifford Geertz had already introduced it in: “Thick description: Toward and Interpretative 
Theory of Culture”, in The Interpretations of Cultures: Selected essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
pp. 3-30. 
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In short, in terms of what concerned social history during the XIXth and 
XXth centuries, an essential and completely different factor was something as 
specific as the marginalisation of Domínguez Ortiz from university classrooms, 
where he could have developed an even stronger and efficient manner of 
training historians than from his post as high school teacher. And on the other 
hand, the survival of the importance and influence of the historian Manuel 
Tuñón de Lara, who emigrated from Spain purely for family reasons but was 
attracted to Communism in his circles of exile. Even so, economicism was still 
current in Metodología de la historia social en España by Tuñón de Lara.23 But we 
would still have to wait until 1982 for Álvarez Junco and Pérez Ledesma, as 
factual representatives of the classical history of the workers’ movement, to 
publicly announce the need for a turning of tables, methodologically 
speaking.24
That is why it is not so strange that the renewal of social history in Spain 
came about by very different means, which were closer to Domínguez Ortiz’s 
manner of understanding life and history. Specifically, in terms of the XIXth 
and XXth centuries, the person who ended the connection between the 
“workers’ movement” and “social history” were Joaquín Romero Maura with 
his La rosa de fuego: El obrerismo barcelonés de 1899 a 1909 (1975), and Juan Pablo 
Fusi, with his Política obrera en el País Vasco (1880-1923)25. Another line of 
research is that of Ignacio Olábarri and his Relaciones laborales en Vizcaya (1890-
1936) (1978) and José Andrés-Gallego in his lecture on the persistence of 
traditional mentality in the workers of the XIXth and well into the XXth 
centuries.26
Other Developments of Social History in Recent Decades 
In a paper published by Social Science History, Louise A. Tilly ponders the 
relationship between people’s history and social science history, believing that 
they “share important characteristics. They represent rapidly expanding bodies 
of historical research. Their advocates practice them with commitment and 
enthusiasm (…) Nevertheless, they are separate domains. To the extent that 
                                                 
23 Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Metodología de la historia social de España (revised edition, Madrid: Siglo 
Veintiuno de España, 1977). On Tuñón de Lara see: José Luis de la Granja et al., eds., Tuñón de Lara y 
la historiografía española (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1999). 
24 José Álvarez Junco and Manuel Pérez Ledesma, “Historia del movimiento obrero, ¿una segunda 
ruptura?”: Revista de Occidente, 2 (1982): 19-41. 
25 Joaquín Romero Maura, La rosa de fuego: El obrerismo barcelonés de 1899 a 1909 (Barcelona: 
Grijalbo, 1975); Juan Pablo Fusi, Política obrera en el País Vasco (1880-1923) (Madrid: Turner, 1975). 
26 See Ignacio Olábarri, Relaciones laborales en Vizcaya (1890-1936) (Durango: Zugaza, 1978); José 
Andrés-Gallego, “La Iglesia y la cuestión social: Replanteamiento”, in Estudios históricos sobre la 
Iglesia española contemporánea (El Escorial: Colegio Universitario Reina Cristina, 1979), pp. 11-116 
(republished as facsimile in La Iglesia en España: Textos históricos, Madrid: Fundación Histórica 
Tavera, 2000, CD-ROM). Later, using a more methodological focus (which allows us to specify what 
we say here), Ignacio Olábarri ¿Lucha de clases o conflicto de intereses? Ensayos de historia de las 
relaciones laborales (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1991). 
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people’s historians stress subjectivity, individual experience and evidence 
internal to individual and hence neglect both theory and analysis, they do fall 
short of social science. To the extent that they reject collective biography for an 
individual focus, they diminish their own capacity to understand variation and 
resort instead to descriptive detail or ideal types.” This is a long quotation, but 
also one that invites thought for all social historians.27
In a perceptive review, Laurence Veysey writes that “political history has 
always dominated the entire discipline, in precisely those quantitative terms 
which social historians admire as evidence of anything.” The new connection 
between social and political history has been a matter of thought for many 
historians and politologues in recent years. It is the case of, amongst others, 
Samuel P. Hays, who calls for a new synthesis between both branches of history 
in the following terms: “What is the relationship between society and politics? 
To take up this question [he says wisely] and follow the larger political world 
through its intersection with the community could well improve the quality of 
local and community history.”28
The “new” political history described by F.J. Caspistegui in this book also 
had its origins in French historians, “Annalists” like Jacques Le Goff and 
“traditional” scholars like René Remond. Febvre and Bloch were determined to 
erase the history of kings and battles from the face of the earth. But their 
prediction proved to be unwise: biography, autobiography and microhistoric 
tales of wars such as the Hundred Years’ War between England and France, etc. 
are all good evidence pointing to the error of the founders of Annales on this 
point. Georges Duby, Eugen Weber, Maurice Agulhon, Jean-François Sirinelli 
and Max Ferro are only a few of the historians who cultivate this at the same 
time old and new soil.29
In the 1980s, historical sociology was brought to the forefront by Philip 
Abrams, Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly. Thus, macrohistory coexist side by 
side with microhistory. It was a historical sociology that was also comparative, 
but comparative history is a difficult task and historians often attempt to 
compare that which cannot be compared. Although there are good books 
written on the subject, such as the one written by Peter Kolchin about the 
                                                 
27 Louise A. Tilly, “People’s History and Social Science History”, Social Science History, 7 (1983): 457-
474, quotation on p. 461. 
28 Laurence Veysey, “The ‘New’ Social History in the Context of American Historical Writing”, Reviews 
in American History, (1979): 1-12, quotation on p. 2; Samuel P. Hays, “Politics and Social History: 
Toward a New Synthesis”, in James B. Gardner, and George, R. Adams, eds., Ordinary People and 
Everyday Life. Perspectives on the New Social History (Nashville, Tenn.: The American Association for 
State and Local History, 1983), pp. 161-179, quotation on p. 176. 
29 See Professor Caspistegui’s paper. 
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practically simultaneous abolition of slavery in the States and serfdom in 
Russia.30
Social History in the Late XXth Century: the Linguistic and 
Anthropological Turn 
Anthropological history is possibly now at the forefront of our discipline. 
The work of Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas and Marshall 
Sahlins, amongst others, has been a challenge for professional historians, who 
we believe have accepted it with courage and by writing good books.31
The renewal of our discipline was undoubtedly connected with the 
“linguistic turn” (an expression popularised but not coined by the American 
philosopher Richard Rorty), which is the third phase we are looking at in this 
essay. And this is the moment to try to answer the questions posed in the first 
few paragraphs of this paper. Language, like images, veils our knowledge of 
the past: it is clear, particularly so after the works of structuralists like Jacques 
Derrida, who has been and continues to be the most influential of them all, 
                                                 
30 Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology, revised edition (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
Theda Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). Barrington Moore was very influential on Skocpol. A fine essay on him and his main works: 
Dennis Smith, “Discovering Facts and Values: The Historical Sociology of Barrington Moore”, in 
Theda Skocpol, ibid., pp. 313-355. Amongst the many books by Charles Tilly we can cite: As Sociology 
Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981) and Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge 
Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). Controversies on the subject are not entirely 
absent: Goldthorpe, Hart, Hall, Helmes-Hayes and Banks have been involved in them. Three important 
articles can be also cited: Andrew Abbott, “History and Sociology: The Lost Synthesis”, Social Science 
History, 15 (1991): 201-225; Larry J. Griffin, “Narrative, Event-Structure Analyse and Causal 
Interpretation in Historical Sociology”, American Journal of Sociology, 98 (1993): 1094-1133; Gareth 
S. Jones, “From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History”, British Journal of Sociology, 27 (1976): 
295-305. See also: Charles Ragin , The Comparative Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987). Some case studies: Daniel Chirot , Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation of a 
Balkan Colony (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Olivier Zunz, ed., Reliving the Past: The Worlds of 
Social History (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Charles Tilly , ed., 
Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The 
book cited in the text: Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor American Slavery and Russian Serfdom 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1987). 
31 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
which contains the famous essay about Balinese cockfighting and “thick description” as well as his 
memoirs: After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1995); Mary Douglas, Implicit Meanings (London: Routledge, 1975); Victor 
Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Marshall Sahlins, 
Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Marshall Sahlins, Islands 
of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Marshall Sahlins, How ‘Natives’ Think. About 
Captain Cook for Example (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also Aletta Biersack, ed., 
Clio in Oceania: Toward a Historical Anthropology (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
1991); Gananath Obeyesekere, The Apotheosis of Captain Cook. European Mythmaking in the Pacific 
(Princeton-Honolulu: Princeton University Press-Bishop Museum Press, 1992); and Jay O’Brien and 
William Roseberry, eds., Golden Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
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although Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva are also very well known in the 
academic world. 
Having said all this, the idea was accepted that only group or structural 
analysis was insufficient32 and this came to infiltrate pyramidal social 
expression, not only horizontally but also within networks: family networks 
(hence “marriage strategies” – why not state that the role of love has been 
overly forgotten? – and with these the strategies of inheritance); professional 
networks (hence commercial strategies), and customer networks, etc.  
On reaching this point, it can be stated that social history and 
anthropological history had ended hand in hand, if not identifying with each 
other. But the development of both had not yet concluded. The hour of the 
“linguistic turn” had arrived. 
And it can specifically be dated to 1983, in the publication Languages of Class: 
Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 by Gareth Stedman Jones, 
which gave rise to the phrase the “linguistic turn” of social history33 and this 
would also affect anthropological history. 
This “linguistic turn” had to do with the post-structuralism of, amongst 
others, Foucault, who was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, and with so-called 
“post-modern” philosophy, and as can be seen it occurred before 1989. But it 
was triggered by a strange, and perhaps artificial, phenomenon: the 
abandonment of Marxism in a period of months, if not days, by a certain group 
of historians and others studying humanities and social sciences after the 
collapse of the Soviet regime. 
Behind it all – and in the best of its background – the linguistic turn to which 
we are referring constituted an attempt to break the “hermeneutic circle” of 
subjectivity, which cannot but be so – i.e. subjective – even when it is 
questioning the reality of an object. The linguistic turn was in fact presented as 
overcoming those dichotomies set out by the first methodological reflections 
about social history. It aimed to give priority neither to structure nor action, 
object nor subject, objectivism nor subjectivism, macro- nor microeconomy, 
economy itself nor culture, etc. And this simply because it was “another thing”, 
no matter how many of its critics claimed that it was nothing more than a new 
subjectivism and hence a reworked option in favour of the second half of each 
one of the aforementioned dichotomies. 
Its starting point of course invites one to think of the latter, dealing as it did 
with an extreme subjectivism.34 But it was not like this at all. In any case, it was 
                                                 
32 See Mike Savage, “Social Mobility and Class Analysis: A New Agenda for Social History?”, Social 
History, 19 (1994): 69-79. 
33 For the evolution of G.S. Jones' thinking, see: Mayfield, David and Thorne, Susan: “Social History and 
Its Discontents: Gareth Stedman Jones and the Politics of Language”: Social History, 17 (1992): 165-
188. 
34 What follows in Miguel A. Cabrera: “Linguistic Approach or Return to Subjetivism? In Search of an 
Alternative to Social History, Social History, 24 (1999): 75-82. 
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about the subjectivism of subjectivism. Jones is not referring to the subjectivism 
that he knows – which of course exists – but to the subjective character of social 
causality. 
The main thing that is clear for Jones and his followers is that the rational 
subject exists. It is not that reality outside the subject does not exist but that 
reality does not possess intrinsic meaning because meaning is provided to it 
precisely by the rational subject. History’s protagonist speaks of the living 
subject and not the subject – i.e. the historian, he or she who knows. Meanings 
are therefore intersubjective creations. 
But this implies that all practice is a projection of the rational. Activity that is 
not rational does not exist. Therefore, “structures” and “objects” in themselves 
(and therefore social “classes”) do not exist; instead, society is the unfolding of 
subjectivity. This means that the culture we refer to as “popular” and politics 
are one and the same thing and that social history and intellectual history 
identify with each other.  
At heart, it is about affirming that social causality (which some placed in 
material matters and productive forces and others in a mentality of unknown 
origin, perhaps material matter, too) is the rational explanation in itself. Social 
causality and rational explanation are one and the same; that is, the social 
position of individuals is not the cause of their actions, for the same reason that 
the conscious (recall “class consciousness”) is not a reflection of social reality. 
Not that there is no relationship between social reality and consciousness – of 
course there is – but it is a rhetorical not a causal relationship. The relationship 
between reality and consciousness is rhetorical because society is not an 
objective structure: it is a product of rationality. Causality is always present in 
the rational subject, the person who elaborates language. And language 
mediates between reality and the individual. From this linguistic mediation 
emerges what we term “known historic reality”, and hence power, gender, 
madness, and prostitution, etc. In short, from this mediation all meaning 
emerges. 
Now, known historic reality is not static simply because of this. The rational 
subject can change the discursive system, the rules of language, and even 
language itself. And if this is changed, meaning is also changed, which is the 
same as saying that a social change is provided – really and positively 
provided, not just linguistically. As a result, politics or the workers’ movement 
– earlier an object of main attention for social historians – do not express social 
interests but are the result of the articulation of the discourse, which previously 
defined areas such as law, work, property, liberty, class, progress or revolution. 
It is not that there exists no political domination or that power lacks a 
relationship to social stratification but that these realities are nothing but 
rhetorical. There exists society and the social, but we cannot understand them 
outside of the discourse. 
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New Possibilities for Social History 
Analysis of the discourse should certainly be a priority in the work of all 
historians. But on reaching this conclusion, it is not necessary to accept 
Derrida’s philosophy of language. Because for those who want to tackle 
historical reality, political language – as well as historiographical language – 
frequently presents itself to us as something autonomous from social reality. 
Has anybody ever thought about the infinite number of different social realities 
that have been expressed using the term “bourgeoisie” as if they were one and 
the same thing, for example? Or that we indiscriminately call the comfortably 
well-off people in the country who monopolise power in modest one-horse 
towns “urban oligarchies” as well as the all-powerful absent landowners who 
govern a large populated city of province? 
To give importance to the analysis of the discourse, it is not necessary to 
accept all the reasoning of Derrida and Jones. But it is true that the analysis of 
the discourse must aspire to the language that in its day served as an attempt to 
describe that reality, without being satisfied with the use of one of our 
languages. We can only access the past through words yet this is a perilous path 
to follow because of our prejudices, such as subjectivism and presentism. 
“Traces,” as Carlo Ginzburg wrote, “are the paths to our remote past, and an 
interpretation of these traces is not an easy task.”35 German hermeneutics is 
therefore now used by historians and recommended by scholars like Paul 
Ricoeur and Michel de Certeau36, citing two writers who were imbued in a 
Christian perspective and therefore far removed from the tradition leading 
from Nietzsche to Derrida. 
But the “linguistic turn” is undoubtedly more radical in the manner that it is 
expressed by Jones. What it brings into doubt is the nature itself of the causality 
of social relations and therefore of its changes. And that is – if you recall how 
we began this reflective piece – what allows to claim that social history is 
undergoing a crisis. 
Luckily, it is a crisis of growth that may however oblige us to redefine the 
origin of many of the main events of world history. In fact, these are currently 
being redefined and today one can speak of an enormous plurality in the way 
of focusing on social and anthropological history.  
In this respect, the “anthropological” and “cultural” turns are some of the 
last “fashions” in history, as witnessed, for example, by the books edited by 
Lynn Hunt and Victoria E. Bonnell. “Fashion in History” would be a good title 
for a well-needed book, because of so many “turns” and new – and not so new 
                                                 
35 Carlo Ginzburg, “Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method”, History 
Workshop Journal, 9 (1980): 5-36. See also his “Spie. Radici di un paradigma indiciario”, in his Miti. 
Emblemi. Storia. Morfologia e storia (Torino: Einaudi, 1986), pp. 158-209. 
36 Paul Ricoeur, Histoire et verité, revised edition (Paris: Seuil, 1964); Paul Ricoeur, Temps et récit, 
revised edition (Paris: Seuil, 1991); Paul Ricoeur, Réflection faite: autobiographie intellectuelle (Paris: 
Sprit, 1995); Michel de Certeau, L’écriture de l’histoire, revised edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). 
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– lines of thought. But in this case, we have to recognise that the influence of 
cultural anthropology has been very important in history in the last quarter of 
the XXth century and the first few years of the 21st century. The work of 
anthropologists has been a challenge for scholars like Richard Price (Alabi’s 
World is also a magnificent example of narrative history), and Peter Sahlins, 
author of Boundaries, a book about communities between France and Spain and 
the proximity they had always maintained despite wars, particularly those 
communities located on the Basque and Catalan borders.37 These are examples 
of books by scholars who can be considered historians as well as 
anthropologists. 
Some Final Reflections 
The real question that has to be answered – and this we believe is the aim of 
almost all papers published in this book – is what a discipline studied by 
thousands of scholars all over the world can do after so many “turns”. It will 
also be evident to any reader of this book that the same problems, trends and 
authors appear pervasively throughout its essays. How can we get at the heart 
of humankind? Qualitative and quantitative methods, macro- and micro- points 
of view, comparison, interdisciplinarity, interest in the local and the universal, 
in all ages, landscapes, and “territories”, a moral and public outlook: all these 
and probably other features nowadays appear in some of the best books 
published on all human and social sciences. And the way to continue along this 
path must at the same time accept the achievements gained by our disciplines 
in the XXth century without abandoning their traditional characteristics, traits 
that have of course reappeared in the last thirty years in somewhat changed 
form. 
Tolerance between diverse trends of research must be reinforced: social 
scientific history as practised, for example, by the members of the American 
Social Science History Association is undeniably useful, but it can be 
complemented by biographies, memoirs and diaries. We believe the motto 
should be “crossbreeding”. Analysis and narrative, tradition and innovation, 
monographs and synthesis: we cannot disregard any of these directions of 
scholarship. There has to be feedback between theory and practice, erklären and 
verstehen, private and public. 
In our sphere, after “linguistic and anthropological turns”, social history 
work must follow the same procedures and aims. Is it possible, from the 
“traces” left to us in the past, to examine without naivety the language of 
sources, to know something about our ancestors? The answer is undoubtedly 
                                                 
37 Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Victoria E. 
Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and 
Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), and all the monographs published in the series 
in which those two books appeared. Richard Price, Alabi’s World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1990); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
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“yes”. The age of postmodernism is already not our age, disregarding those 
scholars who cannot see the complex relationships between history and destiny 
after postmodernism, the relevance of the question about the meaning of 
history. In America – as in other regions of the world – the sinecures that most 
campuses and learned associations have conferred to postmodernist 
practitioners have lead to a revolution guided by very different humanists and 
social scientists, different in age, ideology and specialisation, etc. Will it be 
possible to unite plurality and coherence in our scholarly community? Let our 
younger colleagues answer these questions in the future. 
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